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Abstract
To understand the effect of fiscal policy on the private sector we have to comprehend how
expectations about fiscal variables are formed. However, little is known about the way peo-
ple form expectations about fiscal variables: no undercutting theory exists, not to say em-
pirical evidence. The problem is that “expectations are unobservable” (Bertola and Drazen
[BD93, p.16]).
We generate observable expectations using a combination of laboratory experiments
and real world data from several European countries. Based upon these observable expec-
tations we develop a model of formation of expectations. We fit real world data and study
the effect of fiscal policies. We show that we can study the relationship between private
consumption and government consumption.
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1 Introduction
There is an overgrowing resurgence of interest in the macroeconomic literature concerning the
effects of fiscal policy on the private sector. Under profound reexamination is in particular the
Keynesian perspective of a set of simple relationships between public sector budgeting and eco-
nomic activity, like for example the idea that a cut in government deficit will depress private
consumption and output. A first serious attack against this textbook approach came in the early
eighties from the German Council of Economic Experts [Sac81], expressing what came to be
known as the “German view” on fiscal policy (see Fels and Froelich [FF86], and Hellwig and
Neumann [HN87]). Very broadly, that was the view that a fiscal contraction may be expan-
sionary, rather than contractionary, through the benign impact it may generate on expectations,
when in particular the contraction is understood by the public as to signal lower taxation in the
future.
Subsequent developments of this idea, to constitute a body of theories expressing a more
articulated “Expectations view”, came in the nineties through the contribution of several au-
thors, including Blanchard [Bla90], Drazen [Dra90], Bertola and Drazen [BD93], Sutherland
[Sut97] and Perotti [Per99], among others, whose purpose was to shed light on the circum-
stances and conditions under which Antikeynesian effects, also referred to as non-linear effects
of fiscal policy, are more likely or less likely to occur. In Section 2 we will provide a review of
this literature, focusing in particular on Bertola and Drazen’s [BD93] and Sutherland’s [Sut97]
contributions, which together offer a clear-cutting perspective on the view.
Anticipating briefly, Bertola and Drazen [BD93] develop a model in which government
spending follows an upwards stochastic process with positive drift, which infinitely living con-
sumers expect to be sharply cut when it reaches a critical level, though the exact critical level
is not known. Under such fiscal framework, Bertola and Drazen show that with rational ex-
pectations a simple optimising consumers’ behaviour gives rise to a variety of responses to
the dynamics of government spending, including some consistent with the Antikeynesian view.
Sutherland [Sut97] proposes a complementary model, which concentrates on the effect of gov-
ernment debt in an environment with consumers with a finite lifetime. In the model, debt evolves
stochastically and consumers expect that when the ratio of public debt to income reaches a
threshold, it will trigger a major stabilisation. The model predicts that when the level of debt is
low, fiscal policy has the standard “Keynesian” effect, with more taxes depressing private con-
sumption. Vice versa, when public debt is high and near the threshold, a moderate increase in
taxation may be perceived by the current generation as a relief from a major stabilisation within
their lifetime, and therefore it may stimulate private consumption.
Parallel to the theoretical literature, and in many respects anticipating and corroborating its
developments, several fiscal episodes contradicting conventional wisdom were brought to the
attention of the profession during the 1990’s by various investigations: these include the now
classic paper by Giavazzi and Pagano [GP90] focusing on the astonishing expansionary fiscal
consolidations experienced by Denmark and Ireland in the mid 1980’s; the study of the same
authors [GP96] on the symmetric Swedish experience in the early 1990’s; and a number of other
analyses which documented the evidence of Antikeynesian effects, which apparently happened
in other European as well as non-European countries (see e.g. Alesina and Perotti [AP96];
Alesina and Ardagna [AA98]; Perotti [Per99]; and Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano[GJP00]).
Besides to the experiences of Denmark and Ireland, which between 1983-87 and 1987-89, re-
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spectively, corrected the cyclical adjusted deficit, mainly through public expenditure cuts, by re-
spectively 9.5 and 7.2 percent of GDP relative to the year before the consolidation, and notwith-
standing experienced a cumulative increase in private consumption by 17,8% in Denmark and
14,5% in Ireland, other major episodes of expansionary consolidations have been documented,
in particular, for Belgium between 1983 and 1989, Portugal in 1984-86, Sweden in 1983-89,
Canada in 1986-88, and Italy in 1989-92 (see e.g. Alesina and Perotti [AP96]). Minor episodes
have been also reported for other well-developed countries, including Germany (1981-83), U.K.
(1981-82, 1989-90, and 1994-96), Australia (1986-88), Austria (1995-96), among others; and,
more recently, also for developing countries (see Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano[GJP00]).
Besides to confirm that fiscal policy may indeed generate non-linear effects, the empirical
literature also helped dissecting the circumstances in which either standard or Antikeynesian
effects are more likely to occur: Non-linear effects seem to be associated with the size and
the persistence of the fiscal impulse (Giavazzi and Pagano [GP96], and Giavazzi, Jappelli and
Pagano [GJP00]); also the composition of the fiscal adjustments seems to be important (see
e.g. Alesina and Ardagna [AA98]), with cuts in public sector wages and social security benefits
being apparently more effective for the occurrence of expansionary fiscal consolidation than
tax increases, though less agreed are the reasons why that should be so; even less clear is
the importance of the public debt, with Perotti [Per99] finding that a high or rapidly growing
public debt is positively correlated with non-linear effects, while Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano
[GJP00] rejecting such association.
Unfortunately we do not find a clear link between evidence and theory yet, in particular
when it comes to the role expectations play in the various fiscal episodes investigated. That is
hardly surprising, given that economists typically rely on observable data, while expectations
are unobservable. The standard approach in these cases, also pursued by the empirical studies
quoted above, is to empirically investigate predicted relations between observable variables, like
relationships between fiscal variables and output components, generally private consumption,
and from there to infer the effect which unobservables might have played.
Given, however, the central role that expectations play in the “Expectations view” on fiscal
policy, we believe that something more is requested here to evaluate the theory. In this paper
we aim to contribute to three issues.
First of all, we provide a method to obtain observable expectations, which is based on lab-
oratory experiments. We use field fiscal data from several European countries, including those
where the most impressive Antikeynesian episodes were observed, to generate and register sub-
jects’ expectations for future fiscal variables. Participants in the experiment are exposed to
graphical representations of time series of fiscal variables for a given period and country on a
computer screen. Subjects, which are not aware of the exact period or country, then describe
graphically their expectations for taxes and/or public expenditure for the next year. Given these
expectations the experimental software computes the optimal decision and, based on actual real-
isations of taxes and/or public expenditure in the next year, communicates payoff to the subjects.
Optimal decision and payoffs are based on a simple overlapping generation economy. Then the
economy moves on, fiscal variables are updated to the next period, and subjects describe ex-
pectation for the subsequent year. This goes on for about 15 to 20 years, to obtain a series of
expectations for each subject and country. In this way we recall many series of expectations for
various countries and several participants. A more detailed account of the experimental setup
and of the whole procedure is given in Section 3.
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With these observed expectations we develop an empirical model of formation of expecta-
tions, which can then be used to study the effect of fiscal policy and the validity of the predic-
tions and implications of the “expectation view”. In Section 4, we give a first overview of the
results, which are currently under more careful investigations.
Even from this starting scrutiny, however, three interesting features emerge from the exper-
iment: first of all, our subjects appear to follow some form of “rational” rule in their process of
formation of expectations — which is a key premise for the “expectation view” — since we find
that subjects outperform a trend extrapolating forecaster efficiently using the information on the
whole set of fiscal variables available to them; second, we find a a surprisingly good correlation
between the effects of fiscal policy on private consumption in the field and in the laboratory,
and particularly for those countries and those periods which have most often be considered as
manifestations of Antikeynesian effects, giving in this way some independent support for the
“expectation view”; more generally, the evidence seems quite supportive for the whole idea of
combining real world data with data from laboratory experiments. We will briefly consider the
methodological and philosophical implications of this idea in a concluding Section 5.
2 The “Expectation view”
2.1 Background
During the eighties the so called “German school” (Fels and Froelich [FF86], and Hellwig and
Neumann [HN87]) advanced the idea that expectations about changes in future fiscal policy
may abruptly affect the result of current fiscal policy conduct. Later, during the nineties1, two
of the most articulated expositions of the “Expectation view” on fiscal policy stem from Bertola
and Drazen [BD93] and Sutherland [Sut97]. Bertola and Drazen build on an uninformal discus-
sion of Drazen [Dra90] and Giavazzi and Pagano [GP90]. Sutherland elaborates on Blanchard
[Bla90] also commenting Giavazzi and Pagano.
2.2 A common framework
Both approaches can be reviewed with the help of a general and simple structure: A non-
monetary small economy where fiscal policy follows a known stochastic process and facing a
perfect world capital market. The typical consumer choice’s problem can generally be written
as:
max
 
∞
t
e−(r−θ)(z−t)Et {u(Cz)}dz (1)
where C is consumption of a single homogenous good; Et {·} denotes the expectations operator
conditional on information available at time t; r is the consumer’s rate of time preference and
also the world interest rate on bonds; θ is a Poisson death rate of individuals. When θ is 0, the
1There is also an earlier theoretical literature, developing from the classic Sargent and Wallace [SW81] and in-
cluding also contributions by Drazen and Helpman [DH90], which studies the possibility of counterintuive macroe-
conomic dynamics arising due to expectations of future taxes in face of current unsustainable fiscal policies. The
interest for that earlier literature, however, is on the inflation rate rather than output and private consumption.
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approach reduces to an infinitely living agent model; when instead θ > 0, the approach turns
into the overlapping generations structure proposed by Blanchard [Bla85].
The consumer’s budget constraint is written as:
 
∞
t
(Cz + τz−Y )e−r(z−t)dz ≤ At (2)
where {τt} is the process of taxes net of transfer payments to consumers (τt can be negative in
the case of net positive transfer payments); Y is the income assumed to be constant; and At are
total private assets, which may include claims on both foreigners and on the government.
Under stochastic fiscal policy, and assuming that utility is quadratic in C, the following
general expression for optimal consumption is derived:
Ct = Y +(r +θ)
[
At −
 
∞
t
Et {τz}e−(r+θ)(z−t)dz
]
(3)
The dynamics of private consumption to fiscal policy, hence, depends on: the exact structure
of the utility function considered, i.e. whether a finite or infinite horizon model is considered;
the actual fiscal policy stochastic process; and, at least in principle, the process of expecta-
tions formation, though both Bertola and Drazen [BD93] as well as Sutherland [Sut97] assume
rational expectations.
2.3 The Bertola and Drazen (1993) model
Bertola and Drazen [BD93] consider an infinite horizon model, i.e. θ = 0; without transfer
payments from the government to consumers, that is {τt} is the process of taxes alone; and
with government consumption {Gt} not entering the consumer’s utility function and following
a stochastic process specified below. Giving the intertemporal budget constraints,
 
∞
t
τze
−r(z−t)dz = Bt +
 
∞
t
Gze−r(z−t)dz (4)
equation (3) for the optimal consumption then turns into:
Ct = Y + r(At −Bt)− r
 
∞
t
Et {Gz}e−r(z−t)dz (5)
or, expressing everything in terms of ratios to GDP:
ct = 1+ r ft − r
 
∞
t
Et {gz}e−r(z−t)dz (6)
where ft is the ratio of net foreign assets (At −Bt) to GDP.
Using this basic model, Bertola and Drazen focus on government spending and assume that
it follows a Brownian-motion with positive drift, which would be unsustainable without discrete
adjustments. The ratio of government spending to output, gt , follows the random walk
dgt = ϑdt +σdWt (7)
where {Wt} is a standard Wiener process and ϑ is a positive drift, which is thought to express,
on the one side, the idea that governments tend to expand public expenditure whenever they can,
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Figure 1: The relationship between private consumption and public expenditure in Bertola and
Drazen’s model, see [BD93, p. 19]
but, on the other side, also implying that fiscal policy becomes unsustainable without a discrete
intervention. Given that political agreements to realize fiscal consolidations are often delayed
due to the conflicts typically arising about the distribution of costs imposed by the adjustments,
an idea formerly developed by Alesina and Drazen [AD91] and receiving increasingly credit2,
the latter are modelled by Bertola and Drazen under the assumption that the dynamics of public
expenditure in equation 7 jumps downwards discontinuously only when it reaches excessively
high levels. Whenever gt hits a very high level g¯ a stabilisation will be triggered with certainty,
dropping gt to an initial, lower level gs. In addition, they assume that a stabilisation may also
occur with some common-knowledge probability p at a lower level gc < g¯.
Assuming rational expectations in equation 6, Bertola and Drazen then show how the above
model generates interesting dynamics for the relationships between private consumption and
public expenditure. These can nicely be illustrated with the help of figure 1, which is based on
Bertola and Drazen [BD93, p. 19]3. In the figure, the dashed line c + r f + g = 1 is the bench-
mark case of perfect Ricardian equivalence, where a change in g is exactly matched by a one to
one offsetting change in c. The solid curve c(g; pc) is the dynamics of optimal consumption as
predicted by the present model. The main points to notice are the following. At low values of
g, private consumption c falls less than dollar for dollar with increases in g; until public expen-
diture remains lower than the first possible consolidation level is reached at gc (point A in the
figure), the crowding out effect decreases as g increases. Very close to the possible stabilisation
2See in particular Alesina and Perotti [AP95] for a thorough review of the theoretical and empirical literature
explaining why and when governments are more likely to departure from optimal tax smoothing policy.
3The diagram is drawn assuming r = 0.05, σ = 0.006, ϑ = 0.0045, pc = 0.5 and f = 0. Regarding the assump-
tion of constant net foreign assets ( f = 0), Bertola and Drazen note that theoretically ft is indeed a function of
realized gt . They, however, also notice that the dynamics of optimal consumption is not qualitatively affected by
considering or not considering net foreigners claims.
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point A, private consumption may even increase together with public expenditure. The intuition
is that in this region increases in g increase the probability of a spending cut in the near future
and thus decreases future expected taxes. As noted by Bertola and Drazen, it is interesting to
note how this Keynesian implication (at least for the part in which there is incomplete crowding
out) can arise in this model, despite its very neoclassical structure. At point A the stabilisation
may occur or not. If it does, private consumption jumps up to point D, where of course the
discrete increase in c is less than the cut in g, reflecting that the stabilisation was partially an-
ticipated. If the stabilisation doesn’t take place, first there is a discrete fall in c (point B in the
figure), because gc was clearly miss-perceived as stabilisation point. The economy is now on
the lower dashed curve c(g;0) which corresponds to the case where a discrete cut in g only takes
place when the extreme value g¯ is reached (point C in the figure). At the certain stabilisation
point C, public expenditure drops to point D, without having any effect on c, since the cut was
fully anticipated.
As noted, the focus of Bertola and Drazen for the relationships between private consumption
and public expenditure was motivated by the desire to explain various observed and somehow
unexpected characteristics of the effect of fiscal policy. First of all they notice that most Euro-
pean as well as non-European countries were characterised during the early and mid seventies,
by an inverse relationship between c and g for low values of g, which progressively flattened
out as g was increasingly rising during the late seventies and early eighties. That is a pre-
diction of the model, consistent with the c(g; p)-path above point A. As anticipated in the
introduction, one of the main point was also to show how it happened that in mid-eighties some
countries, most notably Denmark (between 1983 and 1986) and Ireland (1987-89)4, but also
others including Belgium (1984-87), Portugal (1984-86), Sweden (1983-89), realized drastic
fiscal consolidations, mainly (but not only) in the form of public expenditure cuts, which had
quite expansionary effects, also on private consumption. This class of “Antikeynesian” effects
is also consistent with the prediction of the theory, in particular for the part of the c(g; p)-path
below point B. As a further observation, they also pointed out that before the big successful
adjustment between 1987-89, in 1982 Ireland made a first stabilisation attempt, this first time,
however, by increasing taxes rather than cutting expenditure. One of the main consequence
was a big fall in private consumption, as indeed predicted by a standard Keynesian perspective.
Bertola and Drazen suggest a different explanation based on their model: At the time a cut
in public expenditure was expected but did not materialise. Therefore consumption dropped,
which in the model corresponds to the fall in c from point A to B in figure 1.
2.4 The Sutherland (1997) model
Other types of Antikeynesian effects may arise due to the response of private consumption to the
dynamics of public debt, rather than public expenditure; not for that matter, the expansionary
fiscal consolidations alluded to above and described in the literature (see e.g. Giavazzi, Jappelli
and Pagano [GJP00], and others quoted there) have been realized only via expenditure cuts and
not also tax increases.
Within the general structure outlined above, Sutherland’s [Sut97] model focuses specifically
on the dynamics of debt, rather than on government spending, and abstracts away from any
4See Giavazzi and Pagano [GP90].
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consideration of public expenditure Gt , while fiscal policy takes the form of transfer payments
from or to the consumers. More specifically, fiscal policy in normal times can be represented
by the dynamics of public debt, which is governed by the following expression:
dBt = rBtdt + τt (8)
where, given the absence of Gt , transfer payments τt also correspond to primary deficit. The
stochastic elements is introduced into the model via τt , which follows the Wiener process
τt = σdWt (9)
where W is a standard Wiener process and σ is a scaling parameter.
Given equations 8 and 9 alone, fiscal policy would be unsustainable. Government solvency
is, hence, ensured assuming discrete stabilisation programs. These are motivated as a conse-
quence of a “game of attrition” between rival political groups (Alesina and Drazen [AD91]) and
are, hence, implemented only when the debt level B reaches extreme values. U and L denote
upper and lower crisis levels of B. At U , a lump sum tax of size T is imposed on consumers,
bringing B to U −T ; while at L, a transfer to consumer is imposed, which increases B to L+T .
Giving this fiscal environment, optimal consumption in equation 3 turns into:
Ct = Y +(r +θ)
[
At −
 
∞
t
Et {δtT}e−(r+θ)(z−t)dz
]
(10)
where δt is a function taking the value +1/dt when a crisis reduction in debt takes place,
−1/dt when a crisis increase in debt takes place and zero all other times. Thus, in this model
the consumer eats all his flow endowment plus the interest income on assets net of the present
value of expected future taxes; while the effects of fiscal policy on private consumption depend
on the value of the latter variable:
S =
 
∞
t
Et {δtT}e−(r+θ)(z−t)dz (11)
The relationships between the stock of debt B and expected future taxes S(B) is qualitatively
as shown in Figure 2, which is based on Sutherland [Sut97, p. 156]. The dashed 45◦ line is the
case of Ricardian equivalence which corresponds to θ = 0 in the model (i.e. the case of infinitely
long living consumers), so that the discounted value of future expected taxes S is equal to the
stock B of public debt. When θ > 0 the value of S depends on the time and the expected sign
of next stabilisation program. Sutherland [Sut97, p. 154] shows that: a) the closer the stock of
debt B is to the trigger point, the shorter is the expected hitting time; b) likewise, the sign of the
next stabilisation is stochastic, but the relative probability attached to hitting each trigger point
depends on the relative distance between B and U and L. A fiscal transfer which takes place
when B is close to half way between the two trigger points level U and L (that is when B is
close to 0 in Figure 2), has less than a one to one effect on expected future taxes; when, one the
other hand, B is very close to the trigger point, there is more than a one for one effect. Thus,
a positive change in B, that is a fiscal deficit, when B is low (in absolute value) produces the
traditional Keynesian result; while the same change when B is close to U or L generates a fall in
consumption and, symmetrically, a reduction in fiscal deficit an increase in consumption. And
this is the main Antikeynesian result of the model. Contrary to Bertola and Drazen, the structure
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Figure 2: The relationship between public debt and expected future taxes in Sutherland’s model
(see [Sut97, p. 159]).
underlying Sutherland’s model is Keynesian, due to overlapping generations; the possibility of
fiscal crisis and discrete stabilisations, however, produces departures from this standard situ-
ation, since they may alter the intertemporal distribution of taxation between generations: a
moderate increase in taxation near the trigger points produces an Antikeynesian effect because
it makes less likely that a big stabilisation will fall on the current generation.
The model presented has other interesting features, discussed by Sutherland [Sut97]. The
first is that the strength and the region of Antikeynesian effects depends on the size of the
stabilisation program, represented by the size of the lump sum T : the lower T , the weaker is the
strength and the smaller the region of the Antikeynesian effects. That follows since with small
T the tax distribution among generations becomes more equal and, thus, the non-linear effect
in the model smaller. At the limit, when T approaches 0, stabilisation programs have only the
effect of neutralising a current crisis debt. In such limiting case, fiscal policy has the standard
Keynesian effect for all levels of B within the region L−U , and only becomes powerless at the
trigger points themselves.
An other aspect worthwhile noticing is that in this model the realisation of a stabilisation
program has no effect on private consumption since they are fully anticipated when actually
realized. One can, however, have more complex dynamics, for example introducing the idea
of possible intermediate stabilisation (as in Bertola and Drazen [BD93]), or when stabilisation
taxes are unequally distributed across the population alive at the time a stabilisation program is
implemented (as discussed in Blanchard [Bla95]).
Both Sutherland’s [Sut97] and Bertola and Drazen’s [BD93] fiscal environments can be
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made richer and other potential sources of Antikeynesian effect can be considered, for example
those due to distortionary taxation as discussed by Blanchard [Bla90] and others since (includ-
ing Bertola and Drazen [BD93]). Miller, Skildesky and Weller [MSW90] also discuss a model
able to capture some aspects of the Antikeynesian perspective. More recently, Perotti [Per99]
presents a model in which fiscal policy has standard effects at low debt-income ratio level and
Antikeynesian features at high level (as in Sutherland [Sut97]), though in his model such non-
linearities are not due to large discontinuities in fiscal policy and expectations at trigger points,
but to distortionary taxation and credit constraints.
In the current paper we focus on the complementary treatment of public expenditure and
debt in Bertola and Drazen’s [BD93] and Sutherland’s [Sut97] environments since these are
less structured, hence more suitable for experimental investigation, still maintaining all and
more of the essence of the “expectation view” on fiscal policy.
3 The Experimental Setup
How could we identify a model and its parameters (rational) subjects use to form expectations?
There are at least three obvious approaches that we could use:
• We could try to use only field data on G,T,B, and C and introduce some hypothesis that
allows us to link subjects’ expectations and C. However, such an attempt is likely to
fail since the sample of field data is very small and the impact of other factors on C is
considerable and correlated for all members of the economy.
• Alternatively we could generate data for G,T,B and C in the laboratory. But how can we
model the process that generates G,T and B in the laboratory? Explaining subjects that
these data follow a Brownian motion might be too demanding. Alternatively G,T and
B could be determined by some participants playing government. In this case we had to
define a utility function for a government which did not seem to be an easy problem to
solve.
• We therefore decided to combine data from the field with data from the laboratory. We
use field data on G,T and B as a stimulus to generate C in the laboratory. This avoids the
problem of pure lab experiments, namely that G,T and B are artificially generated and
incomprehensible for participants. This approach also avoids the problem of pure field
studies, namely that expectations are unobservable and consumption is affected by noise
which, in the field, is highly correlated for all members of the same economy.
Subjects are exposed to time series of B,∆B,T and G. The representation to participants in the
laboratory is shown in figure 3 or figure 4. The data is from various European countries (Values
are % of GDP). In our experiment we vary two parameters of the experimental setups. One
parameter is the type of forecasts. Some participants make forecasts for G and T simultaneously
(see figure 3), others make forecasts for T only (as in figure 4). The second parameter is the
type of data: net or gross. In the net condition participants are consistently confronted with
values for public consumption G and taxes net of transfers T ; in the gross condition the two
variables consistently stand for total current public expenditure and total taxes. Subjects know
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Figure 3: Treatment: forecasts for T and G
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Figure 4: Treatment: forecasts for T only
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Figure 5: Stimulus data (as G over T )
which of the two conditions they are in. We decided to use both conditions for two reasons:
first, to introduce more variability in the data; second, to test whether or not subjects follow
different expectations formation processes when facing gross or net data.
Table 1 summarises the number of participants in the respective conditions. To ease the
gross net
forecasts for T and G 27 28
forecasts for T only 28 27
Table 1: Number of participants
comparison of our results with the literature we will in the following only report results of the
net-treatment. A summary of the stimulus data for the different countries is shown in figures 5
and 6
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 T (net)  G (net)
Austria
1980 1990
18
20
22
Belgium
1980 1990
10
15
20
Denmark
1980 1990
22
24
26
28
30
Finland
1980 1990
15
20
25
30
France
1980 1990
17
18
19
20
21
Germany
1980 1990
18
19
20
21
22
Greece
1980 1990
5
10
15
Ireland
1980 1990
10
15
20
Italy
1980 1990
5
10
15
20
Netherlands
1980 1990
12
14
16
18
20
Norway
1980 1990
15
20
25
30
Portugal
1980 1990
10
15
20
Spain
1980 1990
10
12
14
16
18
Sweden
1980 1990
15
20
25
30
35
United Kingdom
1980 1990
16
18
20
22
24
Part of the ‘stimulus data’ (subjects did not know the country or the year, however, in addition to T and G they also
knew B and ∆B).
Figure 6: Stimulus data (as G and T over t)
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3.1 Payoffs in the experiment
Subjects derive utility from consumption of two subsequent periods
ut =
t+1
∏
i=t
γCi +(1− γ)Gi with γ =
{
1 net
0.75 gross (12)
subject to the budget constraint
t+1
∑
i=t
(1−Ci−Ti)︸ ︷︷ ︸
savings
·(1+ r)i−t = 0 with r = 0.1 . (13)
In each period t subjects make forecasts (by clicking with the mouse) for ˆTt+1 and ˆGt+1 or
only for ˆTt+1 depending on the treatment. Given this forecast the computer then determines an
optimal consumption level Ct for the current period given equations 12 and 13 (When forecasts
are made for Tt+1 only, the computer assumes that Gt+1 = Gt . This assumption is also main-
tained when payoffs are calculated in period t + 1). In period t + 1 then Tt+1 and Gt+1 realize
and are communicated to the participant. The computer uses equation 13 to determine Ct+1
and then uses equation 12 to calculate the participant’s utility for period t. The participant’s per
minute wage is
w = 0.66 · (ut/u∗t )η where η =
{15000 T forecasts
12000 T and G forecasts (14)
where u∗t is the utility the participant would obtain with forecasting the true values. This trans-
formation from utilities into wages is monotonic and, hence, does not affect the maximisation
problem of the individual. The transformation, however, creates steeper incentives to make
good forecasts. Participants are payed this wage up to two minutes for each forecast. If a par-
ticipant needs more time to complete a forecasts only the first two minutes are payed. We have
introduced this payment scheme to simultaneously encourage participants to think about their
forecasts, but also to remain active.
The experiment was run in the experimental laboratory of the SFB 504 in Mannheim in
December 2000. All 110 participants spent about 2 hours in the laboratory. On average they
made 157 forecasts per participant. Each forecast took them on average 44 seconds to complete.
4 Results
4.1 Evidence for rational expectations
For the presentation of the results we will proceed in three steps: First we will motivate that
subjects are doing more than simply extrapolating trends. To do this, we construct as a reference
case a simple ‘adaptive model’.
ˆTt+1 = ˆβ0 + ˆβ1Tt + ˆβ2Tt−1 (15)
We imagine a hypothetical participant who feeds the data that is already visible on the screen
into an OLS-regression and uses the estimated model to predict the value of T for the next
13
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MSE of adaptive model (dotted line) is larger than MSE of participants forecast (solid line)
Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of mean squared errors.
period. This hypothetical participant extrapolates trends in an adaptive, but efficient way. For
each participant we calculate the mean squared error between the prediction of the above model
ˆTt+1 and the true value Tt+1. Further we calculate for each participant the mean squared error
between the actual prediction of the participant ˜Tt+1 and the true value Tt+1. Figure 7 shows
cumulative distributions of the adaptive model (dotted line) and of the actual forecasts (solid
line).5. We find that on average the mean squared error of the adaptive model is significantly6
larger than the mean squared error of the participants’ actual forecasts. In the next section we
will see that participants deviate in a very reasonable way from the adaptive model. To do that
we explain the difference ˜Tt+1 − ˆTt+1 between the participants forecasts ˜Tt+1 and the adaptive
model ˆTt+1 as a linear function of the difference Tt+1− ˆTt+1 between the true value Tt+1 and the
adaptive model ˆTt+1.
( ˜Tt+1− ˆTt+1) = β · (Tt+1− ˆTt+1)+u (16)
The value of β is estimated for each participant separately. The forecasts of a participant with
β = 0 would be centered around the adaptive model. Forecasts of a participant with β = 1 would
rather be centered around the true value of Tt+1.
Figure 8 shows that indeed most participants deviate from the adaptive model into the di-
rection of the correct value of Tt+1. Our interpretation is that participants use more information
than the adaptive model, e.g. information on B or G. To some degree they might indeed have
rational expectations.
5The adaptive model is the same for each participant. However, participants play different sets of countries.
Therefore also the mean squared error of the adaptive model differs among participants.
6A paired t-test finds t = 4.6747 and P > |t|= 0.0000.
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Figure 8: Participants deviate from adaptive model into the right direction.
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Figure 9: Theoretical predictions for the impact of fiscal environment on expectations
4.2 Impact of Bt and Gt on ∆Tt+1 and ∆Gt+1
Now that we have found in section 4.1 that participants seem to do more than simply extrapo-
lating trends we will try do shed some light on determinants for their forecasts in this section.
In doing that we follow the two models that we have sketched in sections 2.3 and 2.4. Both
models explain how ∆T/∆G depends on the fiscal environment.
Predictions of Sutherland’s model: In Sutherland’s model the relation is driven by B similar
to the relation shown in figure 9. The higher the level of B, the more imminent is a fiscal
consolidation and hence, a substantial increase in taxes. Hence, with high levels of B the value
of ∆T/∆G should be higher than with low levels of B. We therefore estimate
∆T
∆G = β0 +βBB (17)
Following the prediction of the model we should expect βB to be positive.
Predictions of Bertola and Drazen’s model: In Bertola and Drazen’s model, however, the
fiscal environment is determined by G. The larger G, the closer the economy comes to a trigger
point, the sooner a fiscal consolidation will occur which, in turn, will lead to a decrease in
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taxes. Hence the value of ∆T/∆G should decrease in G as shown in figure 9. Once the first
trigger point is reached, and G continues to grow, consumers revise their expectations which
leads, for each trigger point, to a jump in ∆T/∆G (see again the figure). Methods to estimate
such a relationship are numerically very unstable, we therefore use a quadratic function as an
approximation.
∆T
∆G
= β0 +βGG+βG2G2 (18)
Following the prediction of the model we should expect βG2 to be positive.
Estimation method: For both equations (17) and (18) we want to give less weight to obser-
vations with a small ∆G and therefore multiply with ∆G to estimate for Sutherland
∆T = β0∆G+βB∆G ·B (19)
and for Bertola and Drazen
∆T = β0∆G+βG∆G ·G+βG2∆G ·G2 (20)
To eliminate country effects we normalise G and B such that for each country means of G and
B are zero. We estimate coefficients for each participant seperately.
Results: Figure 10 shows cumulative distributions for the estimated coefficients. Consistent
Sutherland Bertola and Drazen
∆T = β∆G+βB ·∆G ·B+ c ∆C = β∆G+βG ·∆G ·G + βG2 ·∆G ·G2 + c
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Figure 10: Impact of B and G on fiscal expectations
with Sutherland’s [Sut97] model we find that an increase in public debt B yields on average to
an increase in expected taxation T . A t-test shows that the coefficient βB is significantly larger
than zero (t = 7.7379, P > |t|= 0.0000).
Estimates are not so well in line with Bertola and Drazen’s [BD93] model. The coefficient
βG2 should be positive, but is so only for slightly more than half of the participants. A t-test
shows that the coefficient βG2 is barely significantly larger than zero (t = 2.0987, P > |t| =
0.0405).
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4.3 Impact of fiscal variables on consumption
In section 4.2 above we have studied the relation between current levels of B and G and expected
changes in T and G. The levels of T and G are, however, not what we are primarily interested
in. More crucial is the level of consumption C.
As described above the consumption levels in the laboratory are determined through equa-
tions 12 and 13. One level for the period where the forecast is made (let us call this level C0)
and another level for the period when forecasted values realize and consumption for the next
period is determined (let us call this level C1). In the underlying overlapping generations model
two types of consumers are present in each period. Young consumers were born at t, made a
forecast at t, and now consume C0t . Old consumers were born at t − 1, made a forecast in this
period, and consume their remaining C1t−1. In the following we will use the mean of these two
values as the value for laboratory consumption.
Clabt =
1
2
· (C0t +C1t−1) (21)
These consumption levels are consistently higher than those in the field. A main reason is that
our subjects have a short planning horizon of only two periods which is substantially shorter that
the one of most real world agents. Also precautionary savings in face of the uncertainty about
fiscal policy do not play a role in the experiment, since optimal consumption is automatically
computed in the experiment from point expectations7. Further, our experimental economy does
not consider the demand for investment (intended and unintended) and exports. Finally the
experimental utility function that drives experimental consumption was never calibrated to fit
real consumption behaviour. Given all these caveats it should be clear that we do not aim to
compare the exact level of consumption in the laboratory with that in the field, but to study how
the two move in response to the same changes in fiscal policy. In order to ease this comparison,
Clabt is normalised using a linear transformation such that it has the same mean and standard
deviation as consumption in the field Cfieldt . This transformation is the same for all participants
but is done separately for each country.
The consumption levels that we have derived in this way are surprisingly similar to con-
sumption levels in the field. Figure 11 compares for Belgium the consumption level in the field
(dark line) with the average consumption level given subjects expectations in the laboratory
(dashed line). While there is no perfect coincidence, patterns of consumption seem to be very
similar. This is even more surprising if we take into account that the laboratory consumption
pattern is derived only using a very simple two-period utility function (equation 12). Correlation
is good also for most other countries. Figure 12 shows the cumulative distribution of correlation
coefficients for all countries from our sample. For most countries laboratory consumption can
explain a considerable amount of the variance in the field consumption.
We now estimate the impact of changes in government consumption ∆G on changes in
private consumption ∆C. The two models that we discussed in sections 2.3 and 2.4 assume
different kinds of impacts.
Predictions of Sutherland’s model: In Sutherland’s model the relation is driven by B similar
to the relation shown in figure 13. The higher the level of B, the more imminent is a fiscal
7Bernasconi and Kirchkamp [BK00] find that in experiments when subjects can make both expectations (in the
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Figure 11: Consumption in the field and in the laboratory for Belgium
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Figure 13: Theoretical predictions for the impact of fiscal environment on consumption
consolidation, and hence, a substantial increase in taxes. Consumers will, thus, react with a
drop in consumption. We therefore estimate
∆Ct+1
∆Gt
= β0 +βBBt (22)
Following the prediction of the model we should expect βB to be negative.
Predictions of Bertola and Drazen’s model: In Bertola and Drazen’s model the economy
comes to a trigger point when G is large, which makes a decrease in taxes more likely. Hence
the value of ∆Ct+1/∆Gt should increase in G as shown in figure 13. Once the first trigger point
is reached, and G continues to grow, consumers revise their expectations which leads, for each
trigger point, to a jump in ∆Ct+1/∆Gt (see again the figure). As above, we use a quadratic
function as an approximation.
∆Ct+1
∆Gt
= β0 +βGGt +βG2G2t (23)
Following the prediction of the model we should expect βG2 to be negative.
Estimation method: For both equations (22) and (23) we want to give less weight to obser-
vations with a small ∆G and therefore multiply with ∆G to estimate for Sutherland
∆C = β0∆G+βB∆G ·B (24)
and for Bertola and Drazen
∆C = β0∆G+βG∆G ·G+βG2∆G ·G2 (25)
To eliminate country effects we normalise G and B such that for each country means of G and
B are zero. We estimate coefficients for each participant seperately.
Results: Figure 14 shows cumulative distributions for the estimated coefficients in the lab-
oratory. We see that estimates for equation 24 are consistent with Sutherland’s model. The
coefficient βB is negative for most participants. A t-test finds also the average βB significantly
smaller than zero (t = −4.5541, P > |t|= 0.0000).
Bertola and Drazen’s model obtains less support from our estimation. We should expect the
coefficient βG2 to be negative. However, most participants have a positive βG2 . Also the averageβG2 is significantly positive (t = 3.5862, P > |t|= 0.0007).
case concerning monetary, rather than fiscal policy) and saving decisions they make precautionary savings too.
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Figure 14: The impact of fiscal variables on consumption in the lab
Comparison with field data: For comparison figure 15 shows the same distributions and
t-statistics for our field data. We see that distributions are much less conclusive as in our labo-
Sutherland Bertola and Drazen
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Figure 15: The impact of fiscal variables on consumption in the field
ratory data. Also t statistics are not significant at all.
5 Concluding remarks on experiments with real world data
The results presented in the previous section are clearly preliminary, but we believe quite en-
couraging. In a first step we found that participants in our experiment deviate consistently from
trend extrapolation into the right direction. This raises hopes that their behaviour might par-
tially be explained through rational expectations. In a second step we derive properties of a
simple expectations formation model. Our laboratory data is more in line with Sutherland’s
[Sut97] model than with Bertola and Drazen’s [BD93] model. In a third step we compare ex-
perimental consumption with consumption in the field. Again we find support for Sutherland’s
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[Sut97] model while Bertola and Drazen’s [BD93] model does not seem to be in line with our
laboratory findings. We are currently conducting a more careful scrutiny of the expectations
made by our subjects, with particular attention to the fiscal episodes more often referred to as
examples of Antikeynesian effects, so to have some direct evidence on the importance that the
“expectations view” on fiscal policy might have actually played in those instances. In addition,
we are in a step of specifying a better developed empirical model of expectations formations
for our subjects, which could perhaps then also be embedded in the theoretical frameworks of
the Bertola and Drazen’s [BD93] and Sutherland’s [Sut97] models, so to analysed which model
better fits real world data.
In addition to the focus and the evidence provided by this study on the specific process
of expectations formations concerning fiscal variables, we believe that a more general novelty
of our investigation is the idea of complementarily using field and laboratory data to test and
shed light on an interesting and important macroeconomic question. Experimental economics
has grown substantially over the last two or three decades as it is now a well-acknowledged
method through which decision theorists, game theorists and microeconomists have tested and
refined theoretical models in their respective field of interests8. Very few experiments have
instead been conducted in the field of macroeconomics. The reason, perhaps, is precisely that
macroeconomists deal with real world questions to a much greater degree than other economists,
in the believe that laboratory experiments cannot really answer to such type of questions. “When
an engineer wants to find out how the temperature affects material’s conductivity, she builds an
experiment in which she changes the temperature, make sure that everything else remains the
same, and looks at the changes in conductivity. But macroeconomists who want to find out,
for example, how changes in the money supply affect aggregate activity cannot perform such
controlled experiments; they cannot make the world stop while they ask the central bank to
change the money supply” (Blanchard [Bla97])
With this paper, however, we think we have shown (and we are confident we will be more
convincing after more careful scrutiny of the results of this experiment) that it is not necessary
to make the world stop to test macroeconomic models experimentally; but that using real world
data as stimulus for subjects in the experiments, it is possible to get evidence on some quite
interesting and practically important macroeconomic questions.
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